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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from the denial of a Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus. The petition was filed in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County before Judge John A.
Rokich.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code

Annotated § 78-2a-3 (1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-25(3) properly preclude

judicial review of an inmate's release date as determined by the
Utah State Board of Pardons?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
§ 77-27-25(3)

Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended):

The determinations and decisions of the Board of Pardons in
cases involving approval or denial of any action, of paroles,
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, orders of
restitution, or remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution,
are final and are not subject to judicial review.

Nothing in

this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil
judgment.
1

§ 76-5-207(4) Utah Code Annotated (1983) (now replaced):
Automobile homicide is a felony of the third degree.
§ 76-3-203(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended):
In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not
to exceed five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or
a facsimile, or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate
term not to exceed

five years to run consecutively and not

concurrently.
§ 77-18-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended):
Whenever a person in convicted of a crime and the judgment
provides for a commitment to the state prison, the court shall
not fix a definite term of imprisonment unless otherwise provided
by law.

The sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for

an indeterminate term of not less that the minimum and not to
exceed the maximum term provided by law for the particular crime.
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence,
regardless of its form or terms, which purports to be for a
shorter or different period of time, shall be construed to be a
sentence for the term between the minimum and maximum periods of
time provided by law and shall continue until the maximum period
has been reached unless sooner terminated or commuted by
2

authority of the board of pardons.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 20, 1989, the appellant filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus with the Third Judicial District Court.

(R. 2)

The respondents filed an answer (R. 53), a motion to dismiss (R.
51), and a memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss (R.
46).

A hearing was held before Judge John A. Rokich on June 5,

1989 (R. 62). The Court made findings of fact, conclusions of
law (R.70) and ordered the petition dismissed (R. 64). Appellant
filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 63).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant entered a guilty plea to a third degree felony
charge of automobile homicide and was committed to the Utah State
Prison by the Second Judicial District Court in and For Davis
County for a term not to exceed five years. The appellant was
given a parole hearing on February 3, 1989, but was denied parole
by the Board of Pardons (R. 10) and was given a five year
sentence expiration date.
The appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
raising a number of grounds, but primarily complaining about the
length of sentence and how it exceeded guideline recommendations
in his case (R. 2-33).

The defendants moved to dismiss, largely

on the grounds and that the Court statutorily cannot review Board
3

of Pardons decisions.
petition

The Court held a hearing and dismissed the

(R. 62). The Court entered findings of fact,

conclusions of law (R. 70), and ordered dismissal of the petition
(R. 65).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The gravamen of the appellant's claim is that he feels he
was unjustly given a five-year sentence, and that § 77-27-5(3)
must be unconstitutional since it does not allow for review of
that sentence.

The defendants position is that a properly

convicted felon has no constitutional right to parole, and in the
absence of a protected liberty interest in the parole grant
process, an inmate is not entitled to judicial review of a parole
denial.

In addition, the appellant has failed to procedurally

attack any of the lower Court's findings or conclusion, and has
failed to provide this Court any grounds for reversal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE APPELLANT HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PAROLE.

Utah's system of sentencing involves, for the most part, the
use of indeterminate terms of commitment.

The appellant in this

case was committed to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years.

This is the appropriate term for

the offense of automobile homicide.

See:

§ 76-5-207(4) Utah

Code Annotated (1983, now replaced) (automobile homicide is a
4

third degree felony); S 76-3-203(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended) (third degree felonies are punishable by a term in the
Utah State Prison not to exceed five years).

Once an offender is

committed to the state prison, the Court no longer has authority
over the offender's release date.

That release date is up to the

board of pardons, who can shorten (but not lengthen) the prison
term, by commutation, pardon, parole or other mechanism.
77-18-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).

See; §

This process has

been made clear by the Utah State Supreme Court in the case of
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985).

"Once sentence has

been imposed by the court, our sentencing system vests almost
complete discretion in the Board of Pardons to determine the
period of time that will actually be served."

.Id. at 277.

The Board of Pardons made a determination in the appellant's
case that the release date should be at the conclusion of the
entire term.

The appellant disputes the fairness of that

determination, referring the Court to such factors as his age,
his prior criminal history, and punishments of other offenders.
The release determinations are not subject to review by the
Courts.
amended).

See:

§ 77-27-5(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as

Utah's Courts have consistently applied this section

in rejecting inmates' claims that the parole board had improperly
applied or ignored guidelines in their cases.
5

See: White v.

Utah State Board of Pardons, Case no. 890126-CA (Utah Ct. App.
Memorandum Decision, July 31, 1989); Summers v. Utah Board of
Pardons, Case no. 890195-CA (Utah Ct. App. Memorandum Decision,
June 22, 1989).

§ 77-27-5(3) constitutionally forbids the

Courts' review of Board of Pardons' decisions because parole
release decisions are entirely discretionary with the board;
there is no constitutional right to be paroled, nor is there a
protected liberty interest at stake in the parole grant process
which would be afforded due process protection.
State Supreme Court has explained:

As the United

"There is no constitutional

or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally
released before the expiration of a valid sentence."

Greenholtz

v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 7 (1979).

A due process interest in the parole grant process

simply does not exist absent a statutory scheme creating such.
Utah's statutes have created no such interest.

In rejecting a

similar type of claim brought before the United States District
Court for Utah Judge Anderson has explained:
Some state laws provide mandatory parole
release standards that must then be carried
out with due process guarantees. U.S. Const,
amend. XIV. In these instances, state
prisoners may have a claim for injunctive
relief if they are prejudiced by false
information in their prison records. In
contrast, the Tenth Circuit has concluded
that Utah Statutes simply established a
parole system but did not give rise to a

6

constitutionally protected interest in
obtaining parole. Dock v. Latimer, 729 F.2d
1287, 1290-91 (10th Cir.)/ cert, denied, 469
U.S. 885 (1984). See Utah Code Ann. tit. 77,
ch. 27 (1980) (as amended 1985) ["Utah Parole
Statute"]. Amendments to the Utah Parole
Statute in 1985 did not disturb the Tenth
Circuit's holding.
Gerrish v. Palacios, et a h , Civil No. 87-C-0826A, (D. Utah,
Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, March 11, 1988 at
p. 9) (Emphasis added).
The foregoing language quoted from the Gerrish case
emphasizes further the appellant's problem.

Since there is no

"constitutionally protected interest in obtaining parole," (Id. )
the appellant has no right to complain about the any absence of
due process at his parole grant hearing or that the board abused
their discretion.

The appellant's claim that the board relied on

a false criminal history may initially appeal to the Court, but
in the absence of an articulable due process right the argument
is without merit.

This is because the granting of parole and the

application of the sentence and release guidelines is entirely
discretionary with the board.

For example, even if an inmate can

show a complete absence of a criminal history, this does not
entitle the inmate to parole or an early release after any
certain time frame.
to grant the writ.

The lower Court therefore properly refused
The Court was not in a position to second-

7

guess the board of pardons and was statutorily precluded from
doing so.
POINT II. THE APPELLANT FAILS TO CHALLENGE ANY SPECIFIC FINDING
OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND SEEKS INAPPROPRIATE REMEDIES.
Appellant has not attacked any of the findings of fact or
conclusions of law.

Without doing so, the appellant provides

this Court no mechanism to reverse the lower court's ruling.
This principle has been clarified by this Court in the case of
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 50
(Ct. App. 1989).

Therein the Court stated:

In order to challenge a trial court's
findings of fact, a party "must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the
trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of
the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'" In re Bartell, 105 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3,4 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987). (further citations omitted).
Appellants often overlook or disregard this
heavy burden. When the duty to marshal is
not properly discharged, we refuse to
consider the merits of challenges to the
findings and accept the findings as valid.
Id. at 51.
Appellant's burden is to establish that the trial court's
findings of fact were "clearly erroneous."

The appellant has

neither made the requisite allegation of error, nor made a

8

demonstration of such before this Court.
Since the findings of fact remain unassailed, the lower
court's conclusions of law retain their underpinnings as well,
and need not be reviewed by this Court.

The Court below

specifically concluded that there was no statutory authority to
review the appellant's sentence, and that the sentence itself was
legal and within the bounds of the Board of Pardons' authority
and within constitutional parameters.

The lower Court also

rejected the appellant's fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendment claims. The appellant advances no specifics as to why
those conclusions (or the finding upon which they are grounded)
are in error.

Absent that, this Court is without basis to

reverse the lower Court's order.
Appellant also seek remedies which this court is not free
deliver.

It is axiomatic that issues which were not raised in a

lower Court will not be first heard on appeal (See; Bangerter v.
Poulton. 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983), and that the appellate court's
spectra of remedies does not extend past review of the lower
court's findings, conclusions, and orders.

The appellant's

initial petition included merely a prayer for a determination
that his incarceration was unlawful and illegal.

The appellant's

brief, however makes specific requests that his guilty plea be
reversed and his sentence vacated.
9

This is a fundamentally

different request than was made in the lower Court, as the
efficacy of the appellant's guilty plea would remain unimpaired
regardless of the Court's determinations concerning the Board of
Pardons' decision-making process.

Pleas are not taken by the

Court which are contingent upon the Board of Pardons' decisions
since neither counsel nor the Court control the Board's
decisions.
SUMMARY
The appeal must fail for a couple of reasons.

First of all,

the appellant has failed to specifically challenge any finding of
fact or conclusion of law upon which the order was based.

More

important, however is the fact that the very type of relief
requested by the appellant is not available.

The Board of

Pardons has plenary power over the release date of inmates
committed to the state prison.

Their parole granting/denial

decisions are not subject to judicial review because that
decision is totally discretionary with the board.

There is no

constitutional right to parole, and Utah's statutory parole
system gives an inmate no protected liberty interest in the
parole process subjecting the parole board to due process rigors.
The statutory provision (§ 77-27-5) precluding judicial review of
the parole grant/denial decision is therefore not only
constitutional but

wise.

It prevents the Courts from having to
10

entertain a review of every disgruntled inmate's objection to
parole board decisions. The dismissal of the appellant's
petition should therefore be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ITfa

day of November, 1989

Kent M. Barry
'
Assistant Attorney General
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